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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Walter Huryk (“Huryk”) appeals the order of the 
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of Brother 
International Corp. (“BIC”) and dismissing his putative class 
action claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
(“NJCFA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.  The District Court 
dismissed that claim—a claim for concealing or failing to 
disclose two design defects present in BIC’s line of Multi-
Function Center (“MFC”) machines—on the ground that 
South Carolina law, not New Jersey law, is the applicable law.  
We will affirm.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
  BIC is a Delaware corporation with a principal place 
of business and headquarters in New Jersey.  It is the primary 
distributor of MFC machines that are manufactured by 
Brother Industries, Ltd. (“BIL”), BIC’s parent entity located 
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in Japan.  BIC began distributing the Brother 3220C, a small 
printer, fax machine, scanner and copier, around August or 
September 2001.  Each MFC machine sold was accompanied 
by a Limited Warranty and User Manual drafted by BIL in 
Japan and translated by BIC.  The Limited Warranty provided 
that the MFC would be “free from defects in materials and 
workmanship, when used under normal conditions” for one 
year, and BIC agreed to repair or replace MFC machines if a 
defect was reported to BIC or an authorized service center 
within the applicable warranty period.  Huryk alleges that 
from 2002 to 2005, BIC and its customer relations, technical 
and marketing executives in New Jersey knew about but 
concealed information regarding two defects in the Brother 
3220C: (1) a defect that caused printer heads to fail and 
display the message “Machine Error 41” before the end of the 
MFC’s expected useful life; and (2) a defect that caused the 
machines to purge excess amounts of ink when not used 
frequently enough. 
 
 A.  The Machine Error 41 (“ME41”) Defect 
 Sometime in 2001, BIC began to receive phone calls 
complaining about the appearance of an error message—
“Machine Error 41”—that would flash across the LCD screen 
of the MFC indicating a voltage issue in the print heads of 
affected machines and causing the machines to stop printing 
until the error message was cleared.  Nineteen calls regarding 
the ME41 defect were received that year.  In some cases, the 
message could be cleared by unplugging and replugging the 
affected machine.  In others, the message could not be cleared 
without replacing the print heads, which, for owners no longer 
covered by warranty, cost approximately the same amount as 
the machine itself.  By 2002, BIC knew that the ME41 
problem related to complications in the machines’ print heads 
but had not yet determined the cause.  In August 2002, BIC 
submitted a fault report
1
 to bring the quality issues and 
                                                 
1
 A fault report is the method by which BIC alerted BIL of 
quality issues after some threshold triggering event, such as 
an unusually large number of customer complaints or a 
quality problem of a particularly serious magnitude.  BIC 
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customer calls BIC had been receiving to BIL’s attention in 
Japan.  BIL investigated the matter, and in November 2002 
provided BIC with a “temporary troubleshooting guide” with 
potential solutions BIC field personnel could implement when 
encountering customers complaining of ME41 defects.  In 
2003, BIC opened two more fault reports concerning the 
ME41 issue, stating that the defect was the “number 1 quality 
issue on this product.”  A. 1674.  By the end of 2003, BIC 
unilaterally extended the print head warranty on machines 
affected by the ME41 defect to eighteen months, and 
requested from BIL “warranty reimbursement and a no cost 
print head.” A. 1738.  In mid-2004, BIL informed BIC that it 
had discovered the cause of the ME41 defect but did not 
know how to fix it.  By the end of the year, BIC lowered the 
cost of replacement print heads from approximately $130 to 
approximately $20 and $10.  In early 2005, BIC again 
extended the print head warranty, this time, to two years from 
the date of purchase, and sent an e-mail notice to registered 
customers who were within the twenty-four month extended 
warranty period.  In June 2005, BIL discovered a permanent 
fix to the ME41 defect and applied the fix to new MFC 
machines.  The only permanent fix for old machines affected 
by the defect was replacement of the print head. 
 
 B.  The Ink-Purging Defect 
 In or around August 2004, BIC’s New Zealand 
counterpart opened up a fault report to launch an investigation 
into the source of a defect in some MFC models that would 
cause the machines to purge excess amounts of ink.  
Essentially, as part of their routine cleaning process, affected 
machines would purge ink too often, emptying ink cartridges 
within seven months or less when the ink should have lasted 
fifteen to twenty months.
2
  In September 2004, BIC made 
                                                                                                             
would provide a description of the problem to BIL, and BIL 
would investigate and attempt to solve the problem.  As part 
of the fault report process, BIC often sent samples to BIL of 
MFCs affected by the defect. 
2
 Ink is commonly used in similar machines as part of the 
routine cleaning process.  The ink-purging defect occurred 
 5 
available to its authorized service centers modified software 
to address the ink-purging defect.  In March 2005, BIC 
created a CD with the modified software that it provided to 
owners for self-installation.  In June 2005, BIC posted the 
revised software to its website.  BIC, however, did not reach 
out to machine owners to notify them about the defect or the 
availability of the revised software; rather, customers learned 
about the modified software only by discovering it on their 
own on the website or by contacting BIC about the defect. 
 
 C.  Walter Huryk 
 Huryk, a South Carolina resident, purchased a Brother 
3220C for approximately $125 from an Office Depot retail 
store in South Carolina on December 11, 2003.  The MFC 
came with the Limited Warranty and User Manual described 
above.  Based on his professional experience as an executive 
of a printing company and personal experience with office 
equipment, Huryk believed his MFC would last between five 
and seven years.  In early 2007, Huryk’s machine displayed 
the ME41 defect, and by April 2007, stopped working 
altogether.  Huryk became aware of the pending litigation on 
April 24, 2007, and one day later disconnected his machine, 
for some reason disposing of it by placing it on the curb. 
 
 In October 2007, Huryk joined in a putative class 
action alleging that the MFC he purchased contained the 
ME41 defect and the ink-purging defect, and that BIC’s 
omissions and concealments concerning the defects 
constituted a violation of the NJCFA.  Huryk alleges that his 
machine ceased functioning as a result of BIC’s failure to 
disclose defects, causing losses because Huryk had to 
purchase more ink than he otherwise would have, paid more 
for his MFC machine than it was worth, and had to purchase a 
replacement machine.  Huryk contends that BIC’s omissions 
and concealments in New Jersey included: (1) observing and 
                                                                                                             
when the automated cleaning process took place too 
frequently.  For the Brother 3320C, this typically happened 
when the machine had been rarely used, paradoxically 
resulting in faster ink loss.   
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participating in the investigation of the ME41 defect without 
disclosing it to consumers; (2) persuading BIL not to recall 
the machines; (3) rejecting the option of suspending sales of 
the machines; (4) intentionally manipulating the warranty 
extension announcement by burying it in the company’s 
website; (5) publishing misleading solutions to the ME41 
defect on its website; (6) learning but failing to disclose the 
breadth of the ink-purging defect; (7) manipulating its website 
to make it appear the ink-purging software fix was an 
“upgrade” and not a solution to a defect; and (8) hiding from 
its customer service operators information about the software 
defect.  
 
 BIC moved for summary judgment, arguing that New 
Jersey law did not apply to Huryk’s claim, and, in the 
alternative, that even if New Jersey law did apply, Huryk 
could not establish (1) an ascertainable loss, (2) a causal 
connection between the alleged conduct and his harm, or (3) 
that BIC engaged in any wrongful conduct, as required by the 
NJCFA.  The District Court granted BIC’s motion and 
dismissed the action, finding that under New Jersey choice-
of-law rules, the factors set forth in the Restatement (Second) 
of Conflicts of Law weighed in favor of applying the law of 
Huryk’s home state of South Carolina, and that South 
Carolina had the most significant relationship with the 
litigation.  Huryk now appeals. 
 
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 
the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2), and we 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s choice of 
law determination.”  Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 
220, 226 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-
of-law rules of the forum state—here, New Jersey—to 
determine the controlling law.  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. 
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Mfg. Co. Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Thabault v. Chait, 
541 F.3d 512, 535 (3d Cir. 2008).  New Jersey has adopted 
the “most significant relationship” test set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.  P.V. v. Camp 
Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 459-60 (N.J. 2008).  This is a two-part 
test.   
 
 The first part of the choice-of-law inquiry is to 
determine whether or not an actual conflict exists between the 
laws of the potential forums.  Lebegern v. Forman, 471 F.3d 
424, 429-30 (3d Cir. 2006); see Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 
460 (“Procedurally, the first step is to determine whether an 
actual conflict exists.  That is done by examining the 
substance of the potentially applicable laws to determine 
whether there is distinction between them. . . .  If not, there is 
no choice-of-law issue to be resolved.”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  There is no dispute that there is a 
conflict between New Jersey and South Carolina consumer 
fraud law, a conflict that, indeed, would be dispositive of 
Huryk’s putative class action.  Among other differences, 
South Carolina, unlike New Jersey, would not permit the 
statutory consumer fraud claims to proceed as a class action.  
See S.C. Code. Ann. § 39-5-140(a) (“Any person who suffers 
any ascertainable loss . . . as a result of  . . . an unfair or 
deceptive method, act or practice declared unlawful by [the 
consumer fraud statute] may bring an action individually, but 
not in a representative capacity, to recover actual damages.”). 
 
 Under the second part of the inquiry, the court must 
determine which jurisdiction has the “most significant 
relationship” to the claim.  Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 461.  
Where a fraud or misrepresentation claim has been alleged, 
the court looks to the factors set forth in § 148 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.  Under subsection 
(1) of § 148, when the “plaintiff’s action in reliance took 
place in the state where the false representations were made 
and received,” there is a presumption that the law of that state 
applies.  Under subsection (2), when the plaintiff’s action in 
reliance takes place in a different state than where the false 
representations were made and received, courts weigh the 
following factors: 
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(a) the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted 
in reliance upon the defendant’s representations, 
 
 (b) the place where the plaintiff received the  
representations, 
 
 (c) the place where the defendant made the 
 representations, 
 
(d) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the 
parties, 
 
(e) the place where a tangible thing which is the 
subject of the transaction between the parties 
was situated at the time, and 
             
(f) the place where the plaintiff is to render 
performance under a contract which he has been 
induced to enter by the false representations of 
the defendant. 
 
§ 148(2).  “The factors enumerated in [the Restatement] 
should be evaluated on a qualitative rather than a quantitative 
basis.”  David B. Lilly Co. v. Fisher, 18 F.3d 1112, 1119 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (discussing sections 145 and 146 of the 
Restatement).  The relative importance to each of the factors 
in a given case “should be determined in light of the choice-
of-law principles stated in § 6 [of the Restatement].”  
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148 cmt. e.  
Those principles are: “(1) the interests of interstate comity; (2) 
the interests of the parties; (3) the interests underlying the 
field of tort law; (4) the interests of judicial administration; 
and (5) the competing interests of the states.”  Camp Jaycee, 
962 A.2d at 463 (internal quotation omitted).     
 
 As a threshold matter, we must determine which 
subsection of the Restatement to apply, i.e., whether the 
subsection (1) presumption in favor of the state of Huryk’s 
reliance applies, or whether we must weigh the five factors 
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enumerated in subsection (2).  BIC argued in the District 
Court for the application of subsection (1) and its presumption 
that South Carolina provides the controlling law because any 
representation made by BIC—such as the Limited Warranty 
and User Manual—was directed to Huryk in South Carolina.  
We recognize that several courts have agreed under similar 
circumstances.  This line of cases reasons that the 
representations—or, as here, omissions—even if originated 
from the headquarters state are actually made in the 
purchaser’s home state when they are directed to the 
purchaser’s home state at the point of sale.  See Laney v. Am. 
Standard Cos., Inc., Civ. No. 07-7991, 2010 WL 3810637, at 
*22 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2010) (following §148(1) and holding 
that each plaintiff’s state’s consumer fraud laws should apply 
in omissions case where plaintiff alleged that defendant 
manufacturer failed to disclose latent defect because the 
relevant warranties were directed to customers in their home 
states); Agostino v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 437, 
463 (D.N.J. 2009) (applying §148(1) to case in which plaintiff 
alleged a billing scheme emanating from New Jersey where 
bills were sent to plaintiffs in their home states). 
 
     We find this approach contradictory to the plain 
language of the Restatement.  The Restatement applies the 
presumption of subsection (1) only when “the plaintiff’s 
action in reliance took place in the state where the false 
representations were made and received.”  Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws §148(1) (emphasis added).  
Construing the location to which a representation is “directed” 
to be the same in which one is “made”—as opposed to the 
location from which the representation emanated—would 
render meaningless the Restatement drafters’ careful 
distinction between “made” and “received.”  Under the 
Agostino/Laney approach, a plaintiff’s state of receipt would 
become the only relevant contact in nearly every case in 
which a defendant is a multistate seller.  It would be 
antithetical to traditional choice-of-law principles to disregard 
the locale of a defendant’s actual misconduct.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148 cmt. c.  
Here, Huryk alleges fraudulent omissions that directly 
emanated from decisions made in BIC’s headquarters in New 
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Jersey, not at the point of sale in South Carolina.  Because 
Huryk received and relied on BIC’s representations in his 
home state of South Carolina, and there was no evidence 
demonstrating that BIC made any omissions or 
misrepresentations in South Carolina, the District Court 
properly applied subsection (2) of the Restatement.
3
  See, e.g., 
Arlandson v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 691, 
708-09 (D.N.J. 2011) (applying subsection (2) under similar 
circumstances); Nikolin v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., Civ. No. 
10-1456, 2010 WL 4116997, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2010) 
(same).   
 
 Under subsection (2), three of the six contacts weigh 
strongly in favor of applying South Carolina law: (a) the place 
where Huryk acted in reliance upon BIC’s representations, (b) 
the place where Huryk received the representations, and (e) 
the place where a tangible thing which is the subject of the 
transaction between the parties was situated at the time.  
Factor (f) is not applicable because there is no contract in the 
case.  Although Huryk is a domiciliary of South Carolina and 
BIC’s place of business is in New Jersey, factor (d) weighs 
slightly in favor of applying South Carolina law.  See § 148 
cmt. i. (noting, in cases of pecuniary loss, that “[t]he domicil, 
residence and place of business of the plaintiff are more 
important than are similar contacts on the part of the 
defendant” because “financial loss will usually be of greatest 
concern to the state with which the person suffering the loss 
has the closest relationship”).  The only remaining questions 
are whether the place where BIC’s alleged omissions took 
place, factor (c), weighs in favor of applying New Jersey law, 
and, if so, whether this contact is of such significance that it 
outweighs the contacts in favor of applying South Carolina 
law.  We find that it does not. 
 
 Accepting Huryk’s premise that there were actionable 
                                                 
3
 Although, as we will explain, we do not agree with the 
court’s conclusion, we refer the reader to the thoughtful 
discussion of the difference between the two subsections in In 
re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation, 257 F.R.D. 
46, 65-66 (D.N.J. 2009).     
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omissions by BIC at its headquarters in New Jersey, we 
conclude that this single contact—factor (c)—does not 
warrant applying New Jersey law.  Nothing else about the 
relationship between the parties, other than the fortuitous 
location of BIC’s headquarters, took place in the state of New 
Jersey.
4
  Huryk’s home state, in which he received and relied 
on BIC’s alleged fraud, has the “most significant relationship” 
to his consumer fraud claim.  In so concluding, we adopt the 
overwhelming majority of courts’ application of New Jersey 
choice-of-law rules under similar circumstances.  See, e.g., 
Montich v. Miele USA, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 2d 439, 449 (D.N.J. 
2012) (“A majority of courts in this District have held that the 
mere fact that a company is headquartered in New Jersey or 
that unlawful conduct emanated from New Jersey will not 
supersede the numerous contacts with the consumer's home 
state for purposes of determining which state has the most 
significant relationship under Restatement § 148(2).”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Arlandson, 792 F. Supp. 
2d at 709 (applying consumer fraud law of plaintiffs’ home 
states where they “received and relied upon the alleged 
misrepresentations . . . , the product is located . . . , and the 
performance of the contract was rendered” even where 
alleged misrepresentations were made in New Jersey); 
Maloney v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 09-2047, 2011 WL 
5864064, at *10 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011) (same); Nikolin, 2010 
WL 4116997, at *4 (“[M]ere allegations that the unlawful 
conduct emanated from New Jersey did not outweigh the 
substantial ties to plaintiffs' home states based on the other 
factors under § 148(2).”); Warma Witter Kreisler, Inc. v. 
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., Civ. No. 08-5380, 2010 WL 
1424014, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2010) (holding that “allegation 
that [the defendant] designed the product's operation in New 
                                                 
4
 The District Court held that the record failed to establish any 
facts pointing to a decision to omit or conceal a material fact 
concerning the ME41 and ink-purging defects by BIC in New 
Jersey, a conclusion with which—as was made clear in oral 
argument—Huryk disagrees.  As discussed infra, even if the 
record could establish that some BIC wrongdoing emanated 
from New Jersey, we would find that South Carolina, not 
New Jersey law, would apply.   
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Jersey does not outweigh the other, more significant, ties to 
Illinois”); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 
Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co. Inc., 929 A.2d 1076, 1086 n.3 
(N.J. 2007) (reversing certification of nationwide class action 
under NJCFA on other grounds, but noting that application of 
the law of a single state to all members of a nationwide class 
is “rare” and acknowledging defendant’s “strong arguments” 
under choice-of-law principles that each plaintiff’s home 
state’s law should apply); Fink v. Ricoh Corp., 839 A.2d 942, 
990-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2003) (applying law of each 
plaintiff’s state in large consumer fraud action).   
 
 Our conclusion is supported by the authors’ 
commentary accompanying § 148(2): “If any two of the 
[148(2)] contacts, apart from the defendant’s domicil, state of 
incorporation or place of business, are located wholly in a 
single state, this will usually be the state of the applicable law 
with respect to most issues.” Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts of Law § 148, cmt j.  Here, Huryk’s reliance, his 
receipt of the representation, the location of the MFC, and the 
sale, all took place in South Carolina.  Accordingly, the § 
148(2) factors weigh strongly in favor of applying South 
Carolina law.      
 
 Applying Section 6 of the Restatement also bolsters the 
conclusion that South Carolina law has the greater interest in 
the litigation.  First, the interests of interstate comity favor 
applying the law of the individual claimant’s own state.  
Applying New Jersey law to every potential out-of-state 
claimant would frustrate the policies of each claimant’s state.  
See Fink, 839 A.2d at 983 (finding that the interests of 
interstate comity “clearly require application of the law of any 
potential claimant's state of residence because application of 
any other state's law would frustrate the domiciliary state's 
legislative policies”).  Second, the interest of the parties 
favors applying South Carolina law: because the only contacts 
between the parties took place in South Carolina, it is 
reasonable to assume that they expected that South Carolina 
law would apply.  The third section 6 factor likely favors 
neither state.  Consumer fraud law serves the dual purposes of 
compensating injured parties—which might favor South 
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Carolina law—and deterring corporate misconduct—which 
might favor New Jersey law.  Fourth, while the interests of 
judicial administration might favor applying one state’s law in 
a putative class action, rather than the law of each plaintiff’s 
home state, New Jersey courts have found that the interests of 
judicial administration must yield to the interests of the other 
factors.  Fu v. Fu, 733 A.2d 1133, 1142 (N.J. 1999).  Finally, 
and most importantly, the interest of South Carolina in having 
its law apply to its own consumers outweighs the interests of 
New Jersey in protecting out-of-state consumers from 
consumer fraud.  See Knox v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., Civ. 
No. 08-4308, 2009 WL 1810728, at *4 (D.N.J. June 25, 2009) 
(“Although it is true that New Jersey seeks to prevent its 
corporations from defrauding out-of-state consumers, it is not 
clear to this Court that New Jersey intended out-of-state 
consumers to engage in end runs around local law in order to 
avail themselves of collective and class remedies that those 
states deny.”); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 348 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Each 
plaintiff’s home state has an interest in protecting its 
consumers from in-state injuries caused by foreign 
corporations and in delineating the scope of recovery for its 
citizens under its own laws.”).   
 
 Huryk relies heavily on In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid 
Contract Litigation, 257 F.R.D. 46 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Tele 
Aid”), in which the district court found that New Jersey law 
should apply in a class action involving out-of-state plaintiffs 
alleging that Mercedes-Benz made false statements and 
omissions under the NJCFA when promoting vehicles 
equipped with an emergency response system which 
Mercedes-Benz allegedly knew would become obsolete.  
Although finding that three of the § 148 factors weighed in 
favor of applying the laws of each plaintiff’s home state, the 
court concluded that the state from which the defendant’s 
omissions and misrepresentations “emanated,” New Jersey, 
had a greater interest in the litigation.  It reasoned that while 
“each of the states from which class members will be drawn 
has an interest in assuring that its citizens will be 
compensated for any harm they may have suffered . . . [,] 
[o]nly New Jersey . . . possesses the additional interest in 
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regulating a corporation headquartered within its borders.”  
Id. at 68.  It found that the NJCFA’s interest in deterring local 
corporations—by permitting class actions and treble 
damages—“would be compromised if the company were 
subjected to the law of states that do not [have such remedies 
available] in consumer fraud cases.”  Id.  
 
 While, to be sure, New Jersey has an interest in 
deterring misconduct by corporations headquartered within its 
borders, it is far from clear that this interest would be 
sufficient to outweigh other significant contacts with a 
plaintiff’s home state.  New Jersey’s deterrent interest might 
well be served by actions involving in-state plaintiffs or 
actions involving additional contacts within New Jersey 
without opening the floodgates to nation-wide consumer fraud 
class actions brought by out-of-state plaintiffs involving 
transactions with no connection to New Jersey other than the 
location of the defendant’s headquarters.   
 
 But even were we to find the reasoning of the Tele Aid 
court persuasive, the case before us is distinguishable.  In Tele 
Aid, the court was bound at the motion to dismiss stage to 
accept as fact that the defendant’s marketing team was solely 
responsible for any alleged misrepresentations and omissions, 
and that all of the misconduct took place in New Jersey.  
Here, however, the District Court found that any 
representations or omissions relied on by Huryk were made by 
BIL in Japan, where the Limited Warranty and User Manual 
was authored.  The District Court expressly held that Huryk 
had not demonstrated “any facts pointing to a decision to omit 
or conceal a material fact” by BIC in New Jersey.  Even 
accepting Huryk’s premise that the District Court erred by 
overlooking certain conduct that occurred at BIC’s 
headquarters in New Jersey—such as obscure or buried 
website announcements and BIC’s decision not to recall the 
machines or fully refund purchasers—it is undisputed that at 
least some of the allegedly wrongful conduct emanated from 
Japan, at BIC’s parent company, in its failure to disclose 
latent defects.  It is also undisputed that BIL authored the 
Limited Warranty and User Manual, the only representations 
made to Huryk in connection with his MFC at the point of 
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sale, and that BIL was significantly involved in decisions 
regarding how to address the ME41 and ink-purging defects.   
 One final observation in this regard.  The Restatement 
instructs courts to discount the relative weight of the place 
where the defendant made the false representations when the 
alleged representations (or omissions or concealments in this 
case) are made in two or more states.  Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws § 148 cmt. h. (“The making of the 
representations provides a more important contact when the 
representations are made only in one state than when they are 
made in two or more.”).  Here, it is undisputed that at least 
some of the responsibility for BIC’s alleged failure to disclose 
the ME41 and ink-purging defects lies with decisionmakers in 
Japan.  Because the alleged omissions or concealments took 
place in New Jersey and Japan, factor (c) of the Restatement 
does not weigh strongly in favor of applying New Jersey law.  
 
 Viewed in light of the principles of § 6 as well as the 
commentary accompanying the Restatement, we find that the 
factors enumerated in subsection (2) of § 148 point decisively 
in favor of applying South Carolina law.  Accordingly, BIC’s 
motion for summary judgment was properly granted.
5
   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The order of the District Court will be affirmed.     
 
 
                                                 
5
 Because we find that New Jersey law does not apply, we 
need not reach BIC’s alternative argument that Huryk had not 
established a violation of the NJCFA, and that the District 
Court had so found.  
